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Abstract 
 
The present research aims to analyse the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty 
after controlling for the countries’ political regime as well as other poverty determinants. 
Most literature focuses on the relation between aid and growth or political regime and 
growth. However, studies of the direct impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction are scarce, 
especially for the recent years and considering the influence of the political regime.  
Therefore, after a literature review in which we summarize the main contributions of 
the literature concerning the determinants of poverty as well as the influence of foreign aid 
on poverty alleviation, we estimate an econometric model using panel data for 102 countries 
between 1995 and 2015. In addition, we proceed to the estimation of the same model 
considering only a subsample of countries that follow the World Bank’s classification of low-
income economies. 
The results obtained allow us to summarize this study in three main conclusions. In 
the first place, foreign aid is not effective in reducing poverty, neither in the full sample nor 
when we only consider the low-income countries. Secondly, political regime seems to have 
an important role in poverty alleviation, suggesting that a more democratic regime 
contributes directly to a decrease in poverty. Thirdly, in low income countries, only the GDP 
per capita seems to be significant in poverty alleviation, capturing the effects of all the other 
channels, even the impact of inequality or political regime. 
As a result, donor countries and institutions should be aware of the need to create 
and develop the institutional environment that promotes poverty alleviation and thus 
improves the living conditions of developing countries. The results suggest that this 
environment involves a more democratic political regime, where citizens can participate in 
the selection of their government. 
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Resumo 
 
A presente investigação tem como objetivo analisar a eficácia da ajuda externa na redução da 
pobreza, tendo em conta o regime político dos países considerados assim como outros 
determinantes da pobreza. A maior parte dos estudos presentes na literatura económica 
focam-se apenas na relação entre a ajuda externa e o crescimento económico ou o regime 
político e o crescimento económico. 
Desta forma, após uma revisão de literatura em que resumimos os principais 
contributos da teoria económica sobre os determinantes da pobreza e a influência da ajuda 
externa na redução deste fenómeno, estimamos um modelo econométrico, com dados em 
painel para 102 países durante o período de 1995 a 2015. Para além disso, procedemos à 
estimação do mesmo modelo, considerando apenas uma subamostra de países classificados 
pelo Banco Mundial como sendo os países de menor rendimento. 
Os resultados obtidos permitem-nos resumir este estudo em três principais 
conclusões. Em primeiro lugar, a ajuda externa não é eficaz na redução da pobreza, nem na 
amostra completa nem quando consideramos apenas os países de menor rendimento. Em 
segundo lugar, o regime político parece ter um papel importante na redução da pobreza, 
sendo que os resultados sugerem que um regime mais democrático contribui de forma direta 
para uma diminuição da pobreza. Por fim, em terceiro lugar, quanto aos países de menor 
rendimento observa-se que apenas o PIB per capita é eficaz na diminuição da pobreza, 
absorvendo os efeitos dos outros canais, mesmo o da desigualdade e o do regime político. 
Assim, os países e instituições dadores devem estar cientes da necessidade de criar e 
desenvolver o ambiente institucional que promove a redução da pobreza e, 
consequentemente, contribui para a melhoria das condições de vida das populações dos 
países em desenvolvimento. Os resultados sugerem que este ambiente institucional envolve 
um regime político mais democrático, no qual os cidadãos podem participar na escolha dos 
seus governos. 
 
Códigos-JEL: I30, F35, O19 
Palavras-chave: Ajuda Externa, Pobreza, Regime Político 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Between 1990 and 2015, the First Millennium Development Goal was achieved: the extreme 
poverty rate halved (United Nations, 2015b). Despite these good results, the United Nations 
established a new set of goals to achieve a more sustainable world and the first one was even 
more ambitious: “to end poverty in all its forms everywhere” (United Nations, 2015a, p. 14). 
The famous economist Atkinson (2009, p. 792) states that “Economics is a moral science”, 
and therefore, it should not just contribute to making the rich richer but should have as its 
main concern to enhance the life of those who have less and are disadvantaged. Fighting 
poverty is a global responsibility and it is important to know whether the efforts being made 
are sufficient and effective. 
One of the foremost commitments required to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals was for rich nations to increase their aid flows toward poor countries (Alvi and 
Senbeta, 2012). Traditionally, aid has been perceived to raise average income in the receiving 
country first, which is then followed by poverty reduction (Alvi and Senbeta, 2012). But as 
stated by the authors, whether aid helps income growth and whether growth translates to 
poverty reduction are two separate questions. In fact, it is plausible that aid exerts a direct 
effect on poverty aside from that derived from overall economic growth.  
Studies on foreign aid effectiveness frequently point out its disappointing results, 
which may be explained by aid misallocation (i.e. wrong recipients), aid distortion (recipient 
governments pursue non-developmental agendas), or the fact that GDP growth is not the 
right measure of aid effectiveness (Yontcheva and Masud, 2005). Nevertheless, these studies 
typically focus on the impact of aid on economic growth and not on its influence on poverty 
reduction (Ali and Isse, 2005; Agénor et al., 2008; Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar, 2008). Other 
authors, although examining the impact of aid on poverty, focus their studies on specific 
types of aid, like aid for the agricultural sector (Kaya et al., 2013). 
The literature that analyses the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty 
typically states that the quality of institutions and good economic policies that promote 
savings and investment are the key factors (Collier and Dollar, 2001; Ali and Isse, 2005). 
Other authors refer donor coordination and donor quality as factors that also improve aid 
effectiveness (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Minasyan et al., 2017). In the same way, Mosley 
et al. (2004) state that policy conditionality has positive impacts on the effectiveness of aid. 
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Bourguignon and Platteau (2017), in turn, warn that aid effectiveness decreases with 
increasing availability. Focusing on the influence of the political regime on the effectiveness 
of foreign aid, Boone (1996) concludes that aid does not significantly improve the basic 
dimensions of human development, e.g., infant mortality. 
To the best of our knowledge, studies on the direct impact of foreign aid on poverty 
reduction are scarce, especially for the recent years and considering the influence of the 
political regime. In fact, most literature focuses on the relation between aid and growth, or 
political regime and growth. As far as we know, only Boone (1996) studies the effectiveness 
of foreign aid on the improvement of human development, conditional on the political 
regime, using five-year averaged data for the period between 1971 and 1990. Alvi and Senbeta 
(2012), in turn, analyse the direct impact of foreign aid on poverty using three poverty 
measures, in 79 developing countries between 1981 and 2004. Although the authors include 
a democracy score in their model, they do not control for the countries’ political regime. 
This dissertation aims to analyse the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. 
Particularly, this study intends to answer the following questions: What are the causes of 
poverty and how does foreign aid influence poverty alleviation? Will the effectiveness of 
foreign aid depend on the level of income of the recipient countries? What is the role of the 
political regime on the effectiveness of foreign aid? 
In a more comprehensive way, the research aims first to define the main concepts 
involved – foreign aid, poverty and political regime – and to summarize the main 
contributions of the literature concerning the influence of foreign aid on poverty alleviation. 
The second goal is to study the effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty reduction through 
the estimation of an econometric model using panel data, after controlling for the countries’ 
political regime and other determinants of poverty, as considered in the literature. Using the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to measure foreign aid, Polity IV as an indicator of 
the countries’ political regime and Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a day as a measure of 
poverty, we will estimate the model for 102 countries between 1995 and 2015. Then, we will 
consider a subsample of low-income economies that follow the World Bank’s classification. 
This topic deserves a particular attention for several reasons. First, for academic 
purposes, research on the effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty reduction is scarce and 
mostly outdated. As well, although the literature acknowledges the relevance of institutions 
and particularly the political regime for the effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty reduction, 
this topic is almost absent from the literature. Finally, the issue of aid effectiveness on 
 
 
 3 
poverty reduction is a relevant topic not only in the academia but also for social purposes, 
making this issue crucial in the policymakers’ agenda. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins by defining the key 
concepts – poverty, foreign aid and political regime – along with the most common 
measures. Chapter 3 is a literature review that synthesizes the main determinants of poverty, 
with a particular emphasis on the studies that analyse the influence of foreign aid on poverty 
alleviation. Chapter 4 describes the model and data used and discusses the results obtained. 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents some conclusions and policy implications about the topic under 
study. 
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Chapter 2. Foreign Aid, Poverty and Political Regime: the concepts 
 
In order to study the effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty reduction and to analyse the 
role of the political regime in this relation, we have first to define the main concepts involved. 
In this chapter, we will start by presenting the main definitions and measures used in 
literature concerning foreign aid, poverty and the political regime.  
 
2.1. Foreign aid 
Foreign aid is regarded as “a contract where the North gives a transfer to the South 
in return for poverty reduction” (Azam and Laffont, 2003, p. 1). One of the most important 
measures of aid flows is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). ODA includes all government aid that aims to 
promote the economic development and welfare of the developing countries, which are 
included in the DAC list of ODA Recipients (OECD, 2008). This type of aid covers all the 
concessional flows (flows that are extended at conditions below market rates) provided to 
developing countries by the official sector, with a developmental purpose. Therefore, other 
official flows that are non-concessional, private grants, private flows at market terms, 
remittances and guarantees are not included in ODA’s scope.1 
According to the OECD Statistics, in 2015, the Total Official Flows (ODA and 
Other Official Flows (OOF)) to Developing Countries was of 133 177.92 million dollars. 
The largest recipient was the Asian continent (43 118.2 million dollars), followed by African 
countries, with a total of 31 878.8 million dollars received (OECD, 2017). 
Most of the literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid uses ODA as a measure of 
aid flows (from OECD). However, there are some exceptions. Chong et al. (2009), although 
referring that ODA is their preferred measure, complement their analyses with other two 
concepts: Effective Development Assistance (EDA) and Aid Commitments (from OECD). 
EDA concerns the aid excluded from concessional loans that are made at very low interest 
rates. The second measure refers to country aid commitments that reflect firm obligations. 
Bigsten and Tengstam (2015, p. 77), in turn, use just Country Programable Aid (CPA) (from 
OECD), which is part of ODA “that is subject to multi-year programing at the country 
level”. Kaya et al. (2013) focus on the part of ODA for the agricultural sector and Alvi and 
                                                 
1 http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/beyond-oda.htm (accessed on 07.03.2018) 
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Senbeta (2012) disaggregate ODA flows by type (grants vs. loans) and source (bilateral vs. 
multilateral) (from OECD). Finally, Yontcheva and Masud (2005) use not only ODA, but 
also aid from projects led by European non-governmental organizations in developing 
countries. In what concerns the main goal of foreign aid, several authors refer that there was 
a change in recent years. The main objectives of aid programs are no longer intensive 
industrialization programs or GDP growth, but focus on the reduction of poverty (Mosley 
et al., 2004; Yontcheva and Masud, 2005). Collier and Dollar (2002) also refer that although 
aid flows can be used to pursue other objectives, like rebuild post-conflict societies or for 
humanitarian emergencies, the main goal is the reduction of poverty. Boone (1996) have 
analysed the motives for giving aid and concluded that political, strategic and welfare interest 
of donors have also a significant impact. 
 
2.2. Poverty 
Mabughi and Selim (2006, p. 1) generally define poverty “as social deprivation from 
a decent quality of life”. In their article, these authors describe some of the definitions and 
measures of the poverty phenomenon, pointing out that it is a broad concept with 
implications in different social and economic dimensions. 
The different definitions of poverty result from the difficulty in defining what quality 
of life is. Mabughi and Selim (2006) claim that the first definitions of poverty adopted an 
income or monetary approach and that, after 1970s, a multidimensional approach has been 
prevalent.  
The monetary (or income) approach defines quality of life based on material well-
being, often measured by income or consumption (Sen and Anand, 1997; Mabughi and 
Selim, 2006). Following this concept, the poor are those who are income deprived. The 
simplest way to identify them is to use poverty lines to define the minimum standard of living 
based on income or consumption. In 2015, the World Bank defined a threshold of $1.90 per 
day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) to identify extreme poverty.2 The Poverty 
Headcount Ratio is the proportion of the population below the poverty line (Mabughi and 
Selim, 2006). Many authors use this ratio to measure poverty. In fact, it is one of the poverty 
measures with more available information in terms of countries and period of time. 
Furthermore, as mentioned by Mabughi and Selim (2006), the Poverty Headcount Ratio 
                                                 
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2017/04/14/what-are-poverty-lines (accessed on 10.11.2017) 
and http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq (accessed on 29.12.2017) 
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depends on a poverty line that is known with precision and its computation is very simple. 
Although its advantages and the fact that it is widely used, the Poverty Headcount Ratio has 
some limitations. As pointed out by Chong et al. (2009), this indicator does not differentiate 
the poor. A person that is just below the poverty line is in a different situation from someone 
who does not have income at all. Besides the fact that the Poverty Headcount Ratio does 
not take into account the short-fall of income from the poverty line (violates the 
monotonicity axiom),3 Sen (1976) also refers that this indicator does not translate changes in 
the distribution of income among the poor (violates the transfer axiom).4 To overcome this 
limitation, the Poverty Gap Index is frequently used, defined as “the mean shortfall from the 
poverty line when counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall, and expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line” (Chong et al., 2009, p. 62). In addition, the Squared Poverty 
Gap is also employed. This index is almost identical to the previous one with the difference 
that the poverty gaps are squared, revealing information about inequality among the poor. 
Collier and Dollar (2002) and Alvi and Senbeta (2012) use the same three measures in their 
studies. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that although overcoming some of the limitations of 
the Poverty Headcount Ratio, the Poverty Gap and the Squared Poverty Gap focus more on 
the asymmetry and inequality among the poor. To identify who are poor the Poverty 
Headcount Ratio is the best indicator, fulfilling the objective with simplicity and precision. 
The multidimensional approach is proposed by Sen and Anand (1997). According to 
the authors, poverty “can involve not only the lack of necessities of material well-being, but 
also the denial of opportunities of living a tolerable life” (Sen and Anand, 1997, p. 4). 
Following this multidimensional view of poverty, the United Nations state that this 
phenomenon “depends not only on income but also on access to social services” (United 
Nations, 1996, p. 38). Therefore, the United Nations identify the poor using a 
Multidimensional Poverty Index that considers not only monetary deprivations but also 
deprivations in other dimensions such as health and education.5 Following the 
multidimensional approach to poverty, Yontcheva and Masud (2005) use some development 
indicators as poverty measures like infant mortality and illiteracy. As with the previous 
indicators, the Multidimensional Poverty Index has some limitations. Firstly, as noted by 
                                                 
3 The monotonicity axiom postulates that “given other things, a reduction in income of a person below the 
poverty line must increase the poverty measure” (Sen, 1976, p. 219). 
4 The transfer axiom postulates that “given other things, a pure transfer of income from a person below the 
poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure” (Sen, 1976, p. 219). 
5http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi (accessed on 10.11.2017) 
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Todaro and Smith (2012), its data concerns households rather than individuals and it does 
not allow to identify differences within households. Secondly, the same authors refer that 
the proxies used are often input rather than output indicators, such as in Education where it 
is only considered the year of schooling rather than the literacy rate. In addition, according 
to Todaro and Smith (2012), also the basic assets chosen to assess the standards of living of 
the household, such as a bicycle or a radio, are questionable. Finally, using a range of 
indicators expressed in different units hinders its computation (Mabughi and Selim, 2006). 
These limitations along with the scarcity of available data on some dimensions of poverty, 
leads to a preference of income indicators when compared to multidimensional ones.  
 
2.3. Political Regime 
In what concerns the political regime, Boone (1996, p. 295) states that it “is 
determined by the type and breadth of persons that politicians take into account when 
choosing government policies”. Following this definition, Boone (1996) distinguishes in his 
theoretical framework three categories of political regimes according to the interest group 
they support: elitist government, egalitarian government and laissez-faire government. The 
author uses an index of political liberties and a dummy which identifies if the country under 
analysis is a liberal democracy. 
Durham (1999, p. 81), in turn, defines political regimes as “the methods politicians 
must use to gain and maintain control of the state”. According to Durham (1999) the proxies 
for regimes used in most of the econometric studies are not correct, because they focus on 
outcomes of processes rather than institutions. The author defends that the institutional 
difference of regimes is in the degree of policymaker discretion or freedom of action. Thus, 
a good measure of political regime according to Durham (1999, p. 84) should “capture the 
continuous nature of executive discretion and objectively measurable institutions that 
distinguish the regimes”. Therefore, the author proposes an alternative measure that 
incorporates the number of effective political parties in government and the constitutional 
framework. 
In fact, the political regime is deeply related with institutions. According to North 
(1992, p. 477) institutions are “the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Therefore, and given the above 
definitions, political regime is one of the dimensions for assessing the institutional quality of 
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a country. More specifically, it is part of the political institutions, along with corruption, for 
example. 
Another way to measure the political regime is to use democracy measures and 
indicators. Acemoglu et al. (2008), for example, use the Freedom House Political Rights 
Index and Polity IV to analyse the correlation between income and democracy. Högström 
(2013) presents an overview of the definitions and measures of democracy, referring that 
both of these indexes (Freedom House Political Rights Index and Polity IV) are the most 
currently used. 
The Freedom House Political Rights Index is divided in two main categories: political 
rights and civil liberties (Högström, 2013). The political rights category includes ten 
indicators that cover the evaluation of the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government. The civil rights category, in turn, includes 
fifteen indicators about freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law and personal autonomy, and individual rights.  
The Polity IV index corresponds to the aggregation of two indices: Democracy 
(DEMOC) and Autocracy (AUTOC) (Högström, 2013). It analyses five dimensions 
including competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and 
regulation of participation and constraints on the chief executive.  
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Chapter 3. Poverty and Aid: main insights from the literature  
 
After defining the main concepts in the previous chapter, the current chapter intends to 
summarize the main contributions of the literature on the influence of aid on poverty 
reduction. To better understand the poverty phenomena, we start by presenting some of the 
main determinants of poverty. Then, we focus on the relation between aid and poverty, 
introducing the main studies and conclusions about the topic under analysis.  
 
3.1. On the determinants of poverty 
There are several theories that aim to describe and explain the causes of poverty, 
either with a more orthodox or a more heterodox flavour. In this section, we will follow 
Blank (2003), who presents several theoretical approaches that discuss the main causes of 
the poverty phenomena. 
The first theory is based on the hypothesis that poverty is caused by the lack of 
effectively functioning markets. According to this approach, the economic organization is 
not sufficiently developed to create jobs and increase productivity. Blank (2003) explains that 
this is typically the case of agricultural subsistence economies, where the farmers have no 
access to outside markets nor credit and therefore they do not benefit from comparative 
advantages or long-term investments.  
However, Blank (2003) also states that poverty may be caused by the market when it 
favours that some individuals become rich at the expense of the poverty of others. Therefore, 
the inequality among individuals requires the limitation and regulation of the markets. This 
approach is followed by Kaya et al. (2013), who emphasize the importance of capturing the 
impact of inequality on poverty, by adding the Gini coefficient to their model.  
At a macroeconomic level, Blank (2003) also refers that this view is often adopted 
by the opponents of globalisation, who argue that rich countries take advantage of the poor 
ones to ensure the low-cost imports. However, Dollar and Kraay (2004) have another 
opinion. In an article where the authors intend to study the impact of globalisation on 
inequality and poverty, Dollar and Kraay (2004) conclude that the increase in trade allows a 
more rapid growth of GDP per capita and there is no significant evidence that this increase in 
trade produces changes in the household income distribution. Therefore, in contrast to the 
opponents’ of globalisation opinion, Dollar and Kraay (2004) advocate that greater openness 
can benefit the poor, increasing their incomes.  
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In contrast to the previous theory, the second approach advocates that the causes of 
poverty are not in the market. Actually, poverty is due to social and political problems, such 
as corruption, wars and social norms that lead to racism or ethnic persecution. In this theory, 
the market is viewed as “an exogenous transmission device” (Blank, 2003, p. 453) that can 
perpetuate or even reinforce these social and political processes, which are the real cause of 
poverty. Following this approach, some economists consider in their studies the impact of 
corruption on poverty (e.g., Mosley et al., 2004 and Chong et al., 2009), while others use indices 
of institutional quality (e.g., Collier and Dollar, 2002) or political liberties (e.g., Boone, 1996).  
In fact, Ribeiro et al. (2015) present institutional environment as a transmission 
mechanism through which the macroeconomic framework can impact poverty. The authors 
refer that government transfers and aid programs, for example, may have a limited effect on 
poverty reduction if the quality of institutions is not improved. In this sense, Blank (2003) 
refers that sometimes the strategies that intend to reduce poverty result in the increase of 
poverty instead. This happens because these strategies provide short-term income assistance, 
creating incentives to be poor.  
The third theory attributes the cause of poverty to individual characteristics. 
According to this approach, poverty exists because some individuals are not able or prepared 
to participate effectively in the market economy (Blank, 2003). The non-participation can be 
caused by the lack of ability to do so (this is the case of children and elderly people) or by 
the lack of productive skills, namely education. In fact, education is often included as a 
variable to explain poverty, using literacy or school enrolment rates as a proxy (e.g., Ali and 
Isse, 2005 and Chong et al., 2009). 
In addition, Blank (2003) also states that in some cases the individual behaviour 
influences poverty. Accordingly, poverty is the result of individual choices: the poor are poor 
because they choose to. This choice, however, may be a free choice – for example, if the 
individual has the opportunity to have a better job but chooses not to take it – or it may be 
a forced one – if the individual has limited opportunities. This last scenario is the case, for 
example, of the social excluded groups that do not have the same incentives to invest in 
education or job search as the rest. 
The fourth explanation for poverty relates with an insufficient public investment in 
education (quantity and quality), health, and other infrastructures (Fan and Zhang, 2008). 
Frequently, the public resources in these economies, such as schools, hospitals and 
transports, are also limited or even absent, making it difficult to develop the country or 
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region. In fact, public expenditure is a very important force for poverty reduction. Studying 
the impact of different types of public expenditure on rural poverty in Uganda, Fan and 
Zhang (2008) explain that public investment increases agricultural productivity, raising 
farmer’s incomes and employment, and also increases agricultural output, which benefits the 
poor by food prices reduction. The importance of public expenditure is also highlighted by 
Mosley et al. (2004), who propose the construction of a Pro-poor expenditure (PPE) index. 
The PPE index intends to identify which government expenditure types are more effective 
in poverty reduction. According to Mosley et al. (2004), the sectors that are usually identified 
are the ones related to health, education and agriculture. Also Ribeiro et al. (2015) underline 
the importance of investment in pro-poor programs and of an efficient distribution of 
essential public services to the linkages between economic growth and poverty reduction. 
According to the authors, growth is recognised in the literature as the most important 
characteristic to reduce poverty. The impact of growth on poverty reduction can be 
improved with increases in the median income and if growth strategies are targeted to sectors 
where poor people are typically allocated to. 
Other macroeconomic variables also influence poverty. Ames et al. (2001), for 
example, highlight the importance of macroeconomic conditions, and hence the role of, for 
instance, inflation and the real exchange rate in poverty reduction. In fact, inflation might 
erode the real wages and assets of the poor, since they typically depend on state-determined 
income that is not indexed to inflation and most of their financial assets are in the form of 
cash and, therefore, not protected from inflation (Ames et al., 2001; Easterly and Fischer, 
2001). The real exchange rate can also have a direct impact on poverty through changes in 
the prices of tradable goods, since the income of the poor depends to a great extent on this 
type of goods, while their consumption is essentially associated with non-tradable goods 
(Ames et al., 2001). 
Finally, the existence of natural resources in a region, such as ore reserves or rich 
soils, is pointed out by Blank (2005) as a local characteristic that can impact poverty. 
According to the author, natural resources together with climate influence the type of 
industries and markets of a region. It can occur that a particular resource has multiple uses 
and therefore encourages the emergence of many enterprises, contrasting with communities 
where there are only one-use resources and therefore less potential economic development. 
Economic development entails structural change (Matsuyama, 2009). Therefore, 
variables such as the Gross Domestic Product per capita, investment rate, industrialization 
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and urbanization rates or even demographic indicators influence a country’s economic 
development and the living conditions of its population. Particularly, the literature focus on 
the gross capital formation and the urbanization phenomena. In what concerns the gross 
capital formation, Akobeng (2017) refers that the literature so far is inconclusive about the 
impact of capital formation and growth on poverty reduction. In this way, the author tests if 
gross capital formation (GCF) had a negative impact on poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa 
countries between 1981 and 2010, concluding that not only the GCF had a poverty-reducing 
impact, but also that this impact increased with the level of institutional development. 
With respect to urbanization, Ravallion et al. (2007) explain that there is not a 
consensus in the literature about the impact of urbanization on poverty. Some authors 
advocate that urbanization is good for poverty reduction, while others instead argue that 
there are negative externalities associated with the geographic concentration of poverty. 
However, Ravallion et al. (2007) conclude in their investigation that the urbanization process 
had a positive and important effect on poverty reduction between 1993 and 2002 for the 90 
developing countries considered. This positive impact is caused by two effects. Firstly, it 
creates new opportunities to those who migrate to urban areas. Secondly, the urbanization 
process has also an impact on the welfare of those who remain in rural areas. Calì and Menon 
(2013) present some of the channels through which this second effect operates. The authors 
refer, for example, that the expansion of urban areas will increase the demand for rural goods, 
creating consumption linkages, and increase the demand for agriculture land for residential 
purposes, raising the prices of this type of land. Likewise, it is also expectable the increment 
of the remittances sent by the migrants to the rural households of origin. Finally, the growth 
of cities is associated with the decrease of consumer prices that can also benefit the rural 
individuals who have access to urban markets. 
 
3.2. Aid and Poverty Reduction: main contributes of the literature 
The relation between foreign aid and poverty reduction is a concern of several 
economists who have studied whether foreign aid is effective in reducing poverty. Some of 
them have concluded that aid promotes – either directly or indirectly, by affecting indicators 
closely related to poverty – the reduction of poverty (Alvi and Senbeta, 2012; Kaya et al., 
2013), while others state that it does not (Boone, 1996; Yontcheva and Masud, 2005; Leeson, 
2008; Chong et al., 2009). A summary table of the literature review can be found in 
Appendices 1 and 2. 
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Chong et al. (2009), based on a sample of 115 developing countries between 1971 
and 2002, conclude that foreign aid does not have a significant impact on poverty nor 
inequality. According to the authors, the reason for this ineffectiveness is not only in 
corruption and poor institutions, but also in misallocation of aid, since donor countries often 
impose to the recipient ones to contract with donor’s enterprises, and in the fact that 
policymakers’ motives for giving aid are inconsistent with poverty reduction. Similarly, 
Boone (1996), in his investigation about the impact of political regimes in the effectiveness 
of aid programs, in a sample of 96 countries between 1971 and 1990, shows that aid does 
not contribute significantly to improvements in basic measures of human development, like 
infant mortality, so it does not benefit the poor. Instead of this, it contributes to increase the 
size of government and consumption. Yontcheva and Masud (2005) also use human 
development indicators, such as adult illiteracy and infant mortality rate, to assess the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty alleviation in approximately 70 developing countries, 
between 1990 and 2001. The authors distinguish between two measures of foreign aid – aid 
from non-governmental organizations (NGO) and official bilateral aid (ODA) – concluding 
that although NGO aid is effective in reducing infant mortality, ODA does not have a 
significant effect on this indicator. Furthermore, none of the aid measures used influence 
significantly the illiteracy rate. According to Yontcheva and Masud (2005) the greater 
proximity to the poor and the fact that bilateral aid is allocated to countries with lower infant 
mortality rate are reasons that justify the grater effectiveness of NGO aid. Finally, Leeson 
(2008) evaluates two hypotheses in his literature review: first, that foreign aid does not 
promote economic development and may even hinder this process; second, that private 
property rights are the key to achieve economic progress. The author finds support in the 
literature for both of these premises and explains that aid can have a negative effect on 
receiving countries because of the transformations it causes in policymakers’ and citizens’ 
incentives and information. 
However, there are other authors who conclude for the effectiveness of aid in terms 
of poverty reduction. Alvi and Senbeta (2012) analyse the impact of foreign aid on 79 
developing countries between 1981 and 2004, using three measures of poverty: Poverty 
Headcount ratio, Poverty Gap and Squared Poverty Gap. The authors’ findings confirm the 
existence of a direct poverty-reducing impact of aid, since the aid coefficient appears to be 
negative and significant for all measures of poverty used. In addition, focusing on aid for 
agriculture, Kaya et al. (2013) use a sample of 46 developing countries between 1980 and 
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2003 to study whether aid targeted to the agricultural sector has an impact on poverty. The 
authors choose this type of aid because of its direct aim at enhancing the lives of the poor. 
They conclude that, in fact, aid oriented to agriculture is effective in reducing poverty, not 
only in the agricultural sector, but also in other ones as this sector is considered a “engine of 
growth” (Kaya et al., 2013, p. 593).  
There are also some articles that aim to analyse the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. In general, there is a consensus among 
authors that the environment of good economic policies, that is, the combination of quality 
institutions and good policies that promotes savings and investment, is the key factor (Collier 
and Dollar, 2001; Ali and Isse, 2005). Collier and Dollar (2001), for example, study, for 62 
developing countries between 1974 and 1997, how can policy reform contribute to a better 
environment that increases the effectiveness of aid in terms of poverty reduction and 
particularly help in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty until 
2015. The authors conclude that this goal can be achieved if better policies are implemented 
together with foreign aid, highlighting the importance of good economic policies for the 
effectiveness of aid. Therefore, some authors defend that aid should be conditional on 
policies or political reforms (Boone, 1996; Mosley et al., 2004). Mosley et al. (2004), in 
particular, analyse the benefits of policy conditionality for 34 countries between 1980 and 
2000. The authors explain that the composition of public expenditure, which can be easily 
manipulated by governments, together with corruption and inequality, are strong 
determinants of aid effectiveness. Hence, with the new conditionality approach, donors can 
orient public expenditures to the pro-poor sectors, increasing the effectiveness of aid in 
terms of poverty alleviation.  
Others refer donor coordination and donor quality as factors that also improve aid 
effectiveness. Minasyan et al. (2017) investigate how donor policies could improve aid 
effectiveness in 146 countries between 1999 and 2011. Using a difference-in-difference 
estimation, they compare the effects of quality-adjusted and unadjusted aid on changes in 
GDP per capita, concluding that cooperation and quality aid have positive income effects, 
contributing to increase GDP per capita in recipient countries. Bigsten and Tengstam (2015)  
focus, in particular, on the impact of donor coordination on the effectiveness of aid for a 
large sample of countries in 2009 and reach the same conclusions: coordinated allocation of 
aid has a positive impact on aid effectiveness. Beyond the increasing possibility to achieve 
donor objectives in recipient countries, for example poverty reduction, aid coordination can 
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also decrease donor transactions costs. However, the loss of political control of aid flows is 
a cost that discourages donors to make efforts towards coordination of aid. 
Finally, the composition of aid is also an important determinant of its effectiveness 
(Alvi and Senbeta, 2012). Disaggregating aid by source (multilateral vs. bilateral aid) and by 
type (grants vs. loans), Alvi and Senbeta (2012) find that multilateral aid and grants are better 
in poverty alleviation than bilateral aid and loans. The authors explain that bilateral aid often 
has other motivations rather than poverty reduction and that loans are probably used mainly 
for financial productive projects rather than poverty alleviation because repayment is 
relevant, unlike grants which do not have repayment conditions. The greater effectiveness of 
multilateral aid, that is aid from international organizations, is also defended by Yontcheva 
and Masud (2005), who find that NGO aid is more effective in reducing infant mortality 
than bilateral aid, as we have referred to previously.  
In the opposite way, Bourguignon and Platteau (2017), in a review article that focuses 
on the analysis of aid supply on aid effectiveness, warn that aid effectiveness decreases with 
increasing availability. According to the authors, whether the donors follow a needs-based 
approach6 or a governance-based approach,7 when the amount of aid increases, its 
effectiveness declines due to two mechanisms. Firstly, due to the behaviour of local elites 
and governments who capture the external funds, resulting in less aid addressed to the poor. 
Secondly, because the probability that a leader with lower poverty aversion or level of 
altruism receives aid is higher. In turn, Ali and Isse (2005) investigate the impact of aid on 
economic growth in 90 countries between 1975 and 2000. The authors also state the negative 
impact of greater aid availability not directly on poverty but on economic growth, which in 
turn may compromise poverty reduction. The authors include in the regression the aid 
squared term to test for nonlinearities between aid and growth and conclude that its 
coefficient is negative and highly significant. Therefore, they confirm the hypothesis that 
there is a limit beyond which more and more aid can be prejudicial to economic growth, 
explaining that this may be due to the limited ability of several countries in absorbing external 
resources.  
                                                 
6 Donors who follow the needs-based approach allocate more funds to the countries who need the most, that 
is to the poorest (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2017). 
7 According to the governance-based approach, donors should allocate aid to the better governed countries 
(Bourguignon and Platteau, 2017). 
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Chapter 4. Does foreign aid reduce poverty? 
 
In this chapter we proceed to the estimation of an econometric regression that aims to 
analyse the effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty reduction, after controlling for the 
countries’ political regimes, as well as other potential determinants of poverty. 
The model is presented in the first part of the chapter. Then, we describe the data 
and main variables used and finally show the results obtained. 
 
4.1. The model 
In order to analyse the influence of foreign aid on poverty reduction, and considering 
the available data, this study considers the 102 countries that received ODA between 1995 
and 2015 and for which we have available information for the main indicators, such as 
Poverty Headcount Ratio and Polity IV. In addition, we create a subsample of 24 low-income 
countries according to the World Bank’s classification.8 Due to missing observations 
regarding some of the variables included in the estimations, the econometric procedure 
eliminates some countries, which is why the number of countries actually considered varies 
across the regressions. 
Since our data set combines cross-sectional and time-series information, this study 
uses panel data estimation. The literature (e.g., Greene, 2012) usually considers the fixed 
effects and the random effects models to deal with panel data. The fixed effects model (FEM) 
assumes that the individual effect is unobserved and correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The random effects model (REM), in turn, assumes that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is not correlated with explanatory variables.  
Our econometric model can be described as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where i represents the country (i = 1, …, 102) and t represents time (t = 1995, …, 2015). 𝑌𝑖𝑡 
is the dependent variable and refers to a measure of poverty of country i at time t; 𝛽1 is a 
vector of coefficients associated with the explanatory variables; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of 
explanatory variables, defined for each country i at time t; 𝛽2 is a vector of coefficients 
                                                 
8According to the World Bank, a low-income economy is the one that has a GNI per capita of $1,005 or less in 
2016, calculated by the World Bank Atlas method 
(https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-
groups (accessed on 9.05.2018)). 
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associated with the control variables; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control variables, defined for each 
country i at time t; 𝛼𝑖 is the unobserved country specific effect (in the case of the FEM this 
specific effect is constant whereas in the REM it is considered a random element); and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is 
the random term for country i at time t. 
For the estimation of the model, we used eViews software package, version 10. 
 
4.2. Data 
The present study uses secondary data collected from several organizations. The data 
and sources used will be described below. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable corresponds to poverty. Following the literature (e.g., Alvi 
and Senbeta (2012), Kaya et al. (2013) and Mosley et al. (2004)), and considering the available 
data, we select the Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a day in 2011 PPP (PHR) as a measure 
of poverty, gathered from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2017). The definition of this measure can be found in Section 2.2. Between 1995 and 
2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo was the country in our sample with the highest 
level of extreme poverty, with an average PHR of 85.55%, followed by Burundi and 
Mozambique with an average of 78.5% and 78.17% of the population living with less than 
$1.90 a day, respectively (see Appendix 3). 
This measure was chosen over the Poverty Gap and the Squared Poverty Gap 
because it is the simplest measure of poverty and the most used one in the literature, which 
allows the comparison of results with other studies. Furthermore, it fulfils the purposes of 
the study, which intends to measure poverty rather than to assess for the inequality among 
poor individuals. In addition, due to lack of data regarding Multidimensional Poverty Index, 
the multidimensional approach of poverty was not considered.  
 
Explanatory and control variables 
The main explanatory variables are foreign aid and political regime. In addition, other 
variables are considered, in order to control for the influence of other independent variables 
on poverty (as discussed in Section 3.1). The considered variables are the following: 
• Foreign Aid, measured by the Official Development Assistance per capita, lagged by 
one period, at constant prices of 2015 (ODApc(t-1)). ODA is taken from OECD 
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(OECD, 2018) and includes information about destination of ODA for 181 
developing countries between 1960 and 2016.9 According to the data, Israel was the 
country from our sample that received more foreign aid between 1995 and 2015, 
with an average of 324.32 million dollars per capita received, followed by the 
Solomon Islands and Cape Verde, with an average of 278.76 million dollars per capita 
and 262.32 million dollars per capita received, respectively (see Appendix 3). The 
variable is lagged by one period in order to account for the lagged effect that foreign 
aid has on the economy. 10 ODA is the preferred measure of foreign aid for many 
authors and the most used in the literature (e.g., Boone (1996) and Mosley et al. 
(2004)). 
 
• Political Regime, assessed by Polity IV (POLITY), corresponds to the difference 
between two aggregate indices (Polity’s Democracy and Autocracy indices) since 
1800 until 2016 for all independent countries with total population greater than 
500,000 in 2016, which corresponds to a total of 167 countries. This measure is 
sourced from Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR, 2017) and 
it is one of the most currently used indicator (Högström, 2013). It ranges from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). According to the data, Uruguay, 
Slovenia, Mauritius, Cyprus and Costa Rica are on average the most democratic 
countries in our sample. On the other hand, Swaziland has the lowest Polity IV 
average, suggesting that this is the least democratic country in our sample during the 
period considered (see Appendix 3). As with the Poverty Headcount Ratio, the fact 
that it is widely used allows the comparison of the results with other studies. 
Moreover, while the Freedom House Index is more related to the concept of 
freedom, the Polity IV concerns directly the identification of the political regime. In 
Section 4.3.3, we also test for two dimensions of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) from the World Bank that are linked to the political regime: 
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” and “Voice and 
Accountability”. These governance indicators are somehow related to political 
                                                 
9 Notice that, since ODA is measured as net flows, it may be negative for some countries at certain moments 
of time. 
10 As it will be explained in Section 4.3.3, several lags have been tested. However, there was no significant 
difference in the results. Thus, we chose the one-period lag because it is the same one that was chosen for GDP 
per capita. 
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regime as they intend to reveal “the traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is exercised”.11  
 
• Macroeconomic variables: 
− GDP per capita, lagged by one period, at 2011 international (PPP) dollars 
(GDPpc(t-1)), from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
(World Bank, 2017). As suggested by the literature, we include the real GDP per 
capita to control for the recipient country’s level of economic development (e.g., 
Chong et al., 2009 and Kaya et al., 2013). We use lagged GDP per capita as an 
instrumental variable, to avoid the simultaneity bias between GDP per capita and 
PHR.  
− Inflation (INF), which corresponds to the consumer prices index and is collected 
from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017). 
It expresses the annual percentage change in the cost of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services. As it was explained in Section 3.1, Inflation is an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability, which is pointed out as having an important impact on 
poverty reduction (Ames et al., 2001). 
− Public Expenditure in Education and Health (EXP), which is the sum of the 
public expenditure in education and the public expenditure in health, both 
expressed as a percentage of GDP and available from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017). It is expected that an 
increase in public expenditure in these two sectors contribute to a decrease in 
poverty (Mosley et al., 2004). 
− Trade Openness (OPEN), which is the sum of exports and imports expressed 
as a share of GDP and is sourced from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database (World Bank, 2017). The impact of trade openness on poverty 
is not consensual in the literature, as it was explained in Section 3.1. Following 
Dollar and Kraay (2004), greater openness increases the incomes of the poor. On 
the other hand, Blank (2003) refers that the globalisation and therefore trade 
openness may be a way of rich countries taking advantage of poor ones.  
 
                                                 
11 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (accessed on 10.06.2018) 
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• Natural Resources: 
− Oil and Mineral Rents (RENTS), which is the sum of oil and mineral rents (the 
difference between the commodities’ prices and their cost of production) as a 
share of GDP. This indicator is gathered from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017). As mentioned in Section 
3.1, according to Blank (2005) the access to natural resources increases the 
economic development of the community, which, in turn, may decrease poverty. 
 
• Structural Transformation: 
− Gross Capital Formation (GCF), which is the ratio of investments in fixed assets 
to GDP, gathered from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank, 2017). According to Akobeng (2017), it is expectable that 
an increase in GCF reduce poverty. 
− Urban Population (URB), which indicates the share of population living in urban 
areas and is available at World Development indicators database from the World 
Bank (World Bank, 2017). As it is explained in Section 3.1, although Ravallion et 
al. (2007) and Calì and Menon (2013) point out a poverty-reducing effect of the 
urbanization process, the theoretical literature does not provide a clear-cut view 
regarding its expectable impact. 
 
• Inequality: 
− Gini index (GINI), which measures the inequality of the income distribution 
among the individuals or households of an economy. It ranges from 0 (perfect 
equality) to 100 (perfect inequality) and is available at the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017). When the Gini index, and 
consequently inequality, increases, ceteris paribus, it is expected that the tails of the 
income distribution become more stretched out, which translates into a larger 
mass of individuals with very low and with very high incomes. Therefore, it is 
expectable that, in the same way, the number of individuals below the poverty line 
increases. Consequently, we expect that greater inequality leads to an increase in 
the poverty rate.  
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In Table 1, we show the summary statistics of the variables considered in the model.  
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
Source 
PHR 
Poverty Headcount 
Ratio (% 
population) 
15.316 8.100 94.000 0.000 19.065 
World 
Bank 
GDPpc(t-1) 
GDP per capita, 
lagged for one 
period 
8144.798 7375.525 24489.34 373.435 5335.330 
World 
Bank 
ODApc(t-1) 
Official 
Development 
Assistance per capita, 
lagged for one 
period 
26.337 15.029 561.293 -34.139 39.7105 
OECD 
and 
World 
Bank 
POLITY Polity IV 4.672 7.000 10.000 -10.000 5.330 INSCR 
INF Inflation Rate 8.641 6.222 411.760 -3.704 18.346 
World 
Bank 
GINI Gini Index 43.297 43.250 65.800 16.200 9.537 
World 
Bank 
EXP 
Public Expenditure 
in Health and 
Education (% GDP) 
5.829 5.468 15.569 0.178 3.046 
World 
Bank 
GCF 
Gross Capital 
Formation (% 
GDP) 
24.041 22.747 67.911 4.884 8.274 
World 
Bank 
OPEN 
Trade Openness (% 
GDP) 
78.277 71.663 311.355 15.636 35.857 
World 
Bank 
RENTS 
Oil and Mineral 
Rents (% GDP) 
4.326 1.002 57.440 0.000 7.530 
World 
Bank 
URB 
Urban Population 
(% of total) 
56.065 57.275 95.152 7.830 19.309 
World 
Bank 
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4.3. Estimation results 
In this section we present the results as well as the process of estimation and analysis. 
As explained before, the estimation was carried out for two samples: the full sample, which 
includes all of the 102 countries in our dataset, and the low-income sample, which 
corresponds to the 24 low-income economies in the sample, according to the World Bank 
classification. 
We start by calculating the correlation matrix for all pairs of explanatory variables 
used. The results for the full sample, reported in Table 2, show that the correlation between 
the Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHR) and the Official Development Assistance per capita 
(ODA) is positive and statistically significant. This result may suggest, at first sight, that 
foreign aid is not effective in reducing poverty, since the correlation coefficient expresses a 
positive relation. From the analysis of the table, it is also possible to conclude that most of 
the correlation coefficients are low. Except for the pairs PHR and Urban Population, and 
GDPpc(t-1) and Urban Population, with a correlation of -0.61 and 0.67, respectively, all the 
other pairs of variables have a correlation coefficient of less than 0.6. 
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Table 2 – Correlation Matrix 
 PHR ODApc(t-1) POLITY  GDPpc(t-1) INF EXP OPEN  GINI  RENTS  GCF URB 
PHR 1.000 
----- 
          
ODApc(t-1) 0.0655* 
(0.0858) 
1.000 
----- 
         
POLITY  -0.208*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1232*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
        
GDPpc(t-1) -0.5778*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1431*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2806*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
       
INF -0.0068 
(0.8539) 
-0.0421* 
(0.0624) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0534** 
(0.0156) 
1.000 
----- 
      
EXP  -0.3123*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0555** 
(0.0143) 
0.2571*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2769*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.100*** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
----- 
     
OPEN  -0.1728*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2071*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0269 
(0.2285) 
0.1543*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0532** 
(0.0177) 
0.2144*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
    
GINI  0.2020*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1100*** 
(0.0040) 
0.3483*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1141*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0584 
(0.1157) 
-0.0339 
(0.3642) 
-0.2971*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
   
RENTS  -0.0228 
(0.5346) 
0.0448** 
(0.0443) 
-0.2204*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0251 
(0.2489) 
0.0027 
(0.9047) 
-0.1829*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1033*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0999*** 
(0.0068) 
1.000 
----- 
  
GCF -0.2054*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1154*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0411* 
(0.0682) 
0.1752*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0616*** 
(0.0065) 
0.1161*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2862*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2023*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1152*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
 
URB -0.6089*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0567** 
(0.0104) 
0.2737*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0124 
(0.5748) 
0.2164*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0614*** 
(0.0053) 
0.2299*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1214*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
----- 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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In order to go further in this analysis and to study the effectiveness of foreign aid on 
poverty reduction, controlling for the country’s political regime as well as other potential 
determinants of poverty, we estimate three models (Model I, Model II and Model III) that 
correspond to different combinations of explanatory and control variables. Model I is the 
simplest one, where we only consider the effects of GDP per capita and ODA per capita on 
poverty. In Model II, we add the effect of political regime, by including the Polity IV 
indicator. Finally, Model III contains all the explanatory and control variables described in 
the previous section. 
We carry out the Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects and the random 
effects model. The results for the two samples are presented in Table 3. According to the 
results, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the effects 
and regressors, so we use fixed effects in the model estimation. 
We also proceed with the Redundant Fixed Effects test to evaluate the significance 
of the period and cross section effects. According to the results presented in Table 3, we 
reject the null hypothesis of redundant effects for the two samples. Thus, we proceed to the 
model estimation using fixed effects for both period and cross section.  
 
Table 3 – Specification and significance group effects tests 
 Full sample Low income 
Hausman Test 
44.315751*** 
(0.0000) 
16.285910* 
(0.0917) 
Redundant 
Fixed Effects 
Test 
Cross-section F 
39.583804*** 
(0.0000) 
9.818282*** 
(0.0000) 
Cross-section Chi-square 
1347.426139*** 
(0.0000) 
180.293272*** 
(0.0000) 
Period F 
6.006672*** 
(0.0000) 
2.150863* 
(0.0674) 
Period Chi-square 
134.632968*** 
(0.0000) 
90.630261*** 
(0.0000) 
Cross-Section/Period F 
33.464189*** 
(0.0000) 
7.832802*** 
(0.0000) 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
square 
1360.317591*** 
(0.0000) 
208.335969*** 
(0.0000) 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
The estimation results for the full and low-income samples are presented below as 
well as the robustness analysis, in which we test for different specifications and proxies. 
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4.3.1. Full sample 
Starting with the full sample, the estimation results for the three models are displayed 
in Table 4. According to the R-Squared, we can conclude that the regressions explain about 
93% to 95% of the variation in the poverty measure. In addition, the F-statistics indicates 
that all regressions present a high global significance, rejecting the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero.  
 
Table 4 – Foreign Aid and Political Regime on Poverty – Full sample (1995 - 2015) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHR) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
Constant 
12.62783*** 
(0.0000) 
15.57179*** 
(0.0000) 
-4.785646 
(0.4964) 
ODApc(t-1) 
-0.012048* 
(0.0913) 
-0.011850 
(0.3681) 
-0.008271 
(0.4795) 
POLITY -- 
-0.446909*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.484384*** 
(0.0000) 
GDPpc(t-1) 
0.000446** 
(0.0237) 
0.000345* 
(0.0841) 
0.000445** 
(0.0182) 
INF -- -- 
-0.003998 
(0.7461) 
EXP -- -- 
-0.458490*** 
(0.0000) 
OPEN 
-- -- 0.005141 
(0.7731) 
GINI 
-- -- 0.324102*** 
(0.0000) 
RENTS 
-- -- -0.154518** 
(0.0167) 
GCF 
-- -- -0.131908*** 
(0.0017) 
URB 
-- -- 0.197436* 
(0.0596) 
Model Summary 
R-Squared 0.932476 0.933587 0.951030 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.918235 0.919331 0.938933 
F-statistic 65.47978 65.48407 78.61545 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Observations 690 680 632 
Number of countries 99 98 96 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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In the first place, it is noteworthy the results concerning foreign aid. In Model I, the 
simplest one, the results indicate a negative and significant effect of ODA on PHR, therefore 
overturning the estimated (positive) relationship between PHR and ODA evidenced by the 
simple correlation between these two variables (see Table 2, above). However, when we 
include the impact of political regime, measured by the Polity IV indicator (Model II), ODA’s 
coefficient becomes highly insignificant and the same happens in Model III. We can 
conclude that the negative and significant impact of foreign aid on poverty in Model I results 
in fact from an effect of missing variables. Actually, our estimates suggest that this negative 
impact operates through the institutional channel, so that when we consider the political 
regime separately, measured by the Polity IV indicator, ODA becomes insignificant. 
Therefore, these results suggest that the political regime has an important role in poverty 
reduction.  
These findings go in line with Boone (1996), who concludes that although aid is not 
used differently by distinctive political regimes, when compared to more restrictive regimes, 
liberal ones have a lower infant mortality rate (the indicator used by the author as a proxy of 
poverty). In addition, the author also concludes that foreign aid has an insignificant impact 
on poverty, which is also confirmed by our results. However,  the above findings do not 
support the conclusions of Alvi and Senbeta (2012), who advocate the existence of a direct 
effect of aid on poverty reduction and the insignificance of the institutional environment for 
poverty alleviation. As far as we know, only Boone (1996) and Alvi and Senbeta studied the 
effectiveness of aid on poverty, conditional on institutional variables. Nevertheless, of the 
remaining studies, there are some authors who emphasize the importance of institutional 
variables for aid effectiveness on GDP per capita growth rate (e.g., Collier and Dollar (2001) 
and Ali and Isse (2005)). With regard to the existing literature concerning the impact of aid 
on poverty and not controlling for the institutional variables, Chong et al. (2009) conclude 
that ODA by itself does not have a significant impact on poverty reduction. Also Kaya et al. 
(2013) in their study find that only ODA for the agricultural sector is effective in reducing 
poverty. According to the authors’ findings, all the other sector-specific types of aid, such as 
social infrastructure aid or investment aid for example, have insignificant coefficients. Our 
results confirm the findings of the previous authors. 
Model III includes all the control variables described in Section 4.2. With the 
exception of Inflation and Trade Openness, all the other control variables have a significant 
coefficient. In what concerns the macroeconomic variables and starting with public 
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expenditures, the results reveal that an increase in public expenditures in health or education 
contributes to a decrease in poverty, as the coefficient of this indicator is negative and highly 
significant. This result is consistent with the evidence gathered by the existing literature, in 
particular with the findings by Mosley et al. (2004). With regard to the level of GDP per capita, 
the results indicate a positive and significant relation with the poverty rate in the three 
estimated models. This suggests that countries with higher GDP per capita have higher 
poverty rates, which is the opposite of what should be expected in light of the theory 
described in Section 3.1. However, as it will be explained in the next section, this may be 
related to a non-linear effect of GDP per capita. 
Concerning structural transformation variables and according to the results, the 
investment rate has a significant and negative impact on poverty. This result supports the 
findings by Akobeng (2017), who concludes that Gross Capital Formation contributes 
significantly to poverty reduction. Urbanization, on the other hand, enters the model with a 
positive coefficient, revealing that countries with a higher share of population living in urban 
areas tend to have higher poverty levels. This conclusion goes against the findings by 
Ravallion et al. (2007), who conclude in their investigation that the urbanization process has 
a positive and important effect on poverty reduction. However, it confirms the lack of 
consensus in the theoretical literature about the impact of urbanization on poverty, which 
points to the possibility that this is a complex phenomenon that requires further research. 
With respect to inequality, the specification provides strong evidence (significant at 
a 1% level) that inequality contributes to increasing poverty. The results indicate a positive 
relationship between Gini index and the PHR. This is consistent with other studies present 
in the literature, such as Kaya et al. (2013) and Mosley et al. (2004). 
Finally, the abundance in natural resources measured by Oil and Mineral Rents seems 
to contribute to poverty reduction, as this variable shows a negative and significant impact 
on PHR. This result is consistent with the theory developed by Blank (2005) and presented 
in Section 3.1. 
 
4.3.2. Subsample: Low-income economies 
As previously mentioned, we also estimate the regressions using a subsample that 
consists of the countries in the full sample that are classified as low-income economies by 
the World Bank. In Table 5, we present the estimation output of the three models for this 
subsample. 
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Table 5 – Foreign Aid and Political Regime on Poverty – Low-income subsample (1995 - 
2015) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHR) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
Constant 
105.2631*** 
(0.0000) 
106.5745*** 
(0.0000) 
80.85687*** 
(0.0067) 
ODApc(t-1) -0.031737 
(0.7933) 
-0.004172 
(0.9684) 
0.029838 
(0.7697) 
POLITY -- 
-1.847007*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.925766 
(0.1934) 
GDPpc(t-1) -0.037357*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.035735*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.045567*** 
(0.0003) 
INF -- -- 
-0.194000 
(0.3817) 
EXP -- -- 
-0.040550 
(0.9608) 
OPEN -- -- 0.041965 
(0.5017) 
GINI -- -- 0.162803 
(0.5122) 
RENTS -- -- -0.092351 
(0.7895) 
GCF -- -- -0.369098 
(0.1202) 
URB -- -- 1.336382 
(0.1410) 
Model Summary 
R-Squared 0.925946 0.946504 0.975441 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.806930 0.855363 0.891942 
F-statistic 7.780007 10.38504 11.68200 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000003 
Observations 74 74 67 
Number of countries 24 24 22 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
The estimation results in Table 5 show that the three models maintain high global 
significance, since the F-statistic allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
are equal to zero. The results concerning the R-Squared are also satisfactory, allowing us to 
conclude that our regressions for this subsample explain about 92% to 97% of the variation 
in the poverty rate. 
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When comparing to the previous results in Table 4, the first difference that is 
noteworthy is that, in this subsample, the GDP per capita enters the model with a negative 
and significant coefficient. Apparently, this sustains the theoretical prediction that higher 
GDP per capita levels have a positive impact on poverty reduction. 
In what concerns foreign aid, ODA has a non-significant coefficient in the three 
models, which confirms the previous results. According to that, we can conclude that foreign 
aid seems to have no impact on poverty reduction. 
The political regime maintains its negative and significant coefficient in Model II but 
fails to explain poverty in Model III, where the Polity IV’s coefficient becomes non-
significant. 
As we can observe, in Model III, all the other control variables have a non-significant 
coefficient, so that only the GDP per capita allows us to explain the variation in PHR in the 
subsample of low-income countries. 
The intuition behind these results may be as follows: because the low-income 
countries are in the left tail of the GDP per capita distribution, with very low levels of income 
per capita, and also with a lower income variance when compared to the full sample, the 
average level of GDP per capita tends to capture all effects on poverty. That is, in very poor 
countries, the GDP per capita accounts for the effects of all the other channels, even the 
impact of inequality or political regime, measured by the Gini index and the Polity IV 
indicator, respectively. However, it is also noteworthy that the latter maintains its negative 
and significant coefficient in Model II, when the other control variables are absent, thus 
suggesting that the institutional-quality channel somehow overlaps the impact of the other 
channels (besides GDP per capita) in this subsample of countries.   
 
4.3.3. Robustness analysis 
To verify the robustness of the previous results, we proceed to a robustness analysis 
in which we test some non-linear effects related to GDPpc(t-1) and ODApc(t-1), as well as other 
proxies for the political regime and the interaction between foreign aid and the political 
regime. We focus on Model III, considering the full sample. 
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Table 6 – Robustness Analysis – Non-linear Effects and Interaction Term – Full sample 
(1995 – 2015) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHR) 
 
Model III – GDP2 + 
GDP3 
Model III – ODA2 
Model III – 
ODA*POLITY 
Constant 
17.01489** 
(0.0391) 
-4.645585 
(0.5092) 
-4.503958 
(0.5232) 
ODApc(t-1) 
-0.000687 
(0.9525) 
-0.030082 
(0.2444) 
-0.014401 
(0.3553) 
ODA2 -- 
0.000102  
(0.3438) 
-- 
ODA*POLITY -- -- 
0.001254 
(0.5509) 
POLITY 
-0.425499*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.475725*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.510666*** 
(0.0000) 
GDPpc(t-1) 
-0.004592*** 
(0.0000) 
0.000458** 
(0.0153) 
0.000433** 
(0.0224) 
GDPpc(t-1)2 
0.000000366*** 
(0.0000) 
-- -- 
GDPpc(t-1)3 
-0.00000000000842*** 
(0.0002) 
-- -- 
INF 
-0.008738 
(0.4704) 
-0.005158 
(0.6776) 
-0.004686 
(0.7057) 
EXP 
-0.474578*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.466880*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.460267*** 
(0.0000) 
OPEN 
0.014299 
(0.4147) 
0.005848  
(0.7432) 
0.005268 
(0.7678) 
GINI 
0.381970*** 
(0.0000) 
0.330363*** 
(0.0000) 
0.322834*** 
(0.0000) 
RENTS 
-0.145715** 
(0.0211) 
-0.161556** 
(0.0129) 
-0.156107** 
(0.0157) 
GCF 
-0.118780*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.129758*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.132959*** 
(0.0015) 
URB 
0.051293 
(0.6414) 
0.193307* 
(0.0653) 
0.197951* 
(0.0591) 
Model Summary 
R-Squared 0.953469 0.951117 0.951065 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.941744 0.938921 0.938855 
F-statistic 81.31934 77.98293 77.89510 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Observations 632 632 632 
Number of countries 96 96 96 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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In the first place, we include in the regression the quadratic and cubic functions of 
GDPpc(t-1). Given the contrasting results from Table 4 and 5, which suggest that the level of 
GDP per capita has a positive and unexpected impact on poverty when we consider the full 
sample, but a negative one when we only take into account the low-income countries, we 
include these variables to test non-linear effects related to GDPpc(t-1). The results in Table 6 
show that GDP per capita has a negative and significant first order effect on PHR, which 
dominates when the level of GDP per capita is low (thus consistent with the results for the 
subsample of low-income countries). GDP per capita has a positive and significant second-
order effect and then again, a negative and significant third-order effect. The second-order 
effect dominates for the medium and high-income countries, which then drives the overall 
results reported in Table 4, above.  
Secondly, following other authors (e.g., Collier and Dollar (2001), Ali and Isse (2005) 
and Chong et al. (2009)), we include the quadratic function of ODApc(t-1) in Model III. By 
analysing the results in the second column of Table 6, we conclude that ODApc(t-1) maintains 
its non-significant coefficient and the other variables preserve the sign and significance as in 
the previous estimation. Furthermore, ODApc(t-1)
2 has a non-significant impact on poverty, 
which confirms the previous results that indicate that foreign aid has no influence on poverty 
reduction. 
We also include the interaction term between aid and political regime 
(ODA*POLITY) to test whether the effectiveness of foreign aid varies with the political 
regime. However, as we can see in the third column of Table 6, the coefficient of this term 
is not significant, which suggests that foreign aid does not work differently in more 
democratic regimes. Given the baseline result that foreign aid measured by ODA, per se, has 
no impact on poverty reduction, this is an important result as it also excludes the hypothesis 
that foreign aid has, however, an impact on poverty conditional on the political regime. 
  
 
 
 32 
Table 7 – Robustness Analysis – World Government Indicators – Full sample (1995 - 2015) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio (PHR) 
 Model III – Political Stability Model III – Voice 
Constant 
-10.03587 
(0.1808) 
-9.491971 
(0.2032) 
ODApc(t-1) 
-0.004292 
(0.4769) 
-0.004578 
(0.4457) 
POL_STAB 
-1.238192* 
(0.0575) 
-- 
VOICE -- 
-3.438752*** 
(0.0037) 
GDPpc(t-1) 
0.000821*** 
(0.0000) 
0.000783*** 
(0.0000) 
INF 
-0.009496 
(0.7458) 
-0.008502 
(0.7700) 
EXP 
-0.389987*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.377083*** 
(0.0010) 
OPEN 
-0.003248 
(0.8573) 
0.002849 
(0.8744) 
GINI 
0.408803*** 
(0.0000) 
0.391979*** 
(0.0000) 
RENTS 
-0.175805*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.186388*** 
(0.0033) 
GCF 
-0.136362*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.137796*** 
(0.0012) 
URB 
0.119925 
(0.2930) 
0.114245 
(0.3111) 
Model Summary 
R-Squared 0.959601 0.960042 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.948441 0.949004 
F-statistic 85.98267 86.97155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Observations 560 560 
Number of countries 96 96 
Note: p-value in parenthesis; significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
 
Lastly, we replace Polity IV with some of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) from the World Bank. As we mention in Section 2.3, institutional variables may refer, 
among others, to political regime, corruption, political stability or freedom. Therefore, we 
test for other political institutional variables and their influence on poverty, other than the 
political regime. The WGI covers six dimensions,12 but those included in Table 7 are only 
                                                 
12 The six dimensions of the WGI are: “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism”, “Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of Law” and “Control of 
Corruption”. 
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“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” and “Voice and Accountability”, 
the ones that showed statistical significance in our regressions. The former indicator refers 
to the probability of political instability and politically-motivated violence, such as terrorism, 
while the latter concerns freedom of expression and association and also the ability of the 
country’s citizens to participate in the selection of their government. Both of these indicators 
range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
According to the results presented in Table 7, we can conclude that both indicators 
have a significant and negative impact on poverty. These conclusions seem to confirm the 
previous results that a more democratic political regime contributes to a decrease in poverty. 
Finally, besides these estimations, we also test several alternative lags for ODA, given 
the uncertainty regarding the size of the time lag of the (potential) impact of ODA on 
poverty. However, the results are very similar and, therefore, we opted to select ODA with 
a one-period lag, as it is the same lag as the one considered for GDP per capita. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
In 2015, the United Nations established, as the first Sustainable Development Goal, that 
until 2030 all the forms of poverty should end everywhere (United Nations, 2015a). To 
achieve this goal, United Nations declared that the mobilisation of resources and 
development cooperation should increase (United Nations, 2015a). Actually, since the 
Millennium Development Goals, the objectives of donors turn towards poverty reduction 
(Yontcheva and Masud, 2005). Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether aid can, in fact, 
contribute to the poverty reduction process.  
This dissertation aimed to investigate if foreign aid is effective in reducing poverty 
as well as to evaluate what is the role of the political regime in the effectiveness of foreign 
aid.  
Firstly, we defined the main concepts and explored the most used measures and 
indicators of foreign aid, poverty and political regime. Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) from OECD is the most used measure of foreign aid and therefore it was the one 
chosen. Regarding poverty, we concluded that it is a broad concept with many definitions 
that include the income approach and the multidimensional approach. We opted for the 
Poverty Headcount Ratio at 1$90 a day in 2011 PPP (PHR) as a measure of poverty since it 
is the one for which more data is available. The Polity IV indicator from Integrated Network 
for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) was the chosen indicator for political regime. 
Secondly, we proceeded to a literature review about the main determinants of poverty 
and summarized the most important contributions of the literature about the effectiveness 
of foreign aid. Most of the existing studies focus on the impact of foreign aid on economic 
growth or on alternative development indicators (e.g., infant mortality rate) rather than on 
direct indicators of poverty. The few articles that study the influence of foreign aid on 
poverty reduction conclude that its effectiveness is not consensual. However, there is a 
general agreement that the institutional environment is a key determinant of aid 
effectiveness, with many authors arguing that an environment of good economic policy can 
enhance the effectiveness of aid, both in terms of growth and in terms of poverty alleviation, 
and therefore aid should be conditional on policy and political reforms (e.g., Boone (1996), 
Collier and Dollar (2001), Mosley et al. (2004) and Ali and Isse (2005)). 
Finally, we estimated an econometric model using panel data to test for the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on poverty alleviation, after controlling for the countries’ political 
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regime and other determinants of poverty. The institutional environment, often pointed out 
as an important determinant of aid effectiveness, consists of several dimensions, such as 
control of corruption, political regime and stability or freedom. In this research, we focused 
on the political regime because it seems to be the least studied dimension in the aid and 
poverty literature – most studies use measures of corruption (e.g., Chong et al. (2009) and 
Minasyan et al. (2017)) or institutional quality indexes (Ali and Isse (2005) and Yontcheva 
and Masud (2005)). The estimation was carried out considering 102 developing countries for 
the period between 1995 and 2015. The results concerning the estimation using the full 
sample indicate that foreign aid does not contribute to poverty reduction. Although ODA 
per capita has a negative and significant coefficient when we only control for the level of GDP 
per capita, it becomes non-significant when we add Polity IV and other determinants of 
poverty. This result suggests that the institutional channel – and, in particular, political regime 
– absorbs all the effects of foreign aid on poverty alleviation. It is also noteworthy that almost 
all the control variables have the expected signs, in particular the Gini index, which confirms 
the importance of inequality as a key determinant of poverty. GDP per capita is the exception 
with an unexpected positive coefficient. 
In addition, we proceeded to the estimation of the same models considering only a 
subsample of countries that are classified as low-income economies by the World Bank. The 
results confirm the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. Only GDP per capita 
seems to explain the behaviour of poverty, since it is the only variable with a significant 
coefficient. Furthermore, in opposition to the previous results, when we consider the low-
income countries, the impact of GDP per capita on poverty becomes negative, as expected. 
These results suggest that in countries with a lower income, GDP per capita operates as a 
globalizing indicator, accounting for the effects of the remaining channels. 
Finally, the empirical research ends with a robustness analysis where we tested for 
non-linear effects of GDP per capita and ODA per capita, as well as other proxies for the 
political regime and the interaction between ODA per capita and Polity IV. Once again, we 
conclude for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in alleviating poverty even after the 
introduction of its quadratic function. In what concerns GDP per capita, the results regarding 
the addition of its quadratic and cubic function indicate that the effect of GDP per capita on 
poverty is non-linear, which helps to explain the contradictory behaviour of its coefficient in 
the two samples. For low-income and high-income countries, GDP per capita has a negative 
impact on poverty. However, there is an income spectrum in which GDP per capita increases 
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poverty. The replacement of Polity IV with two dimensions of the World Government 
Indicators (“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” and “Voice and 
Accountability”) confirmed that a more democratic political regime has a negative and 
significant impact on poverty. Finally, the inclusion of the interaction term between foreign 
aid and political regime suggest that foreign aid does not work differently in more democratic 
regimes. 
This dissertation can be summed up in three main conclusions. In the first place, 
foreign aid is not effective in reducing poverty. Secondly, the political regime seems to have 
an important role in poverty alleviation, suggesting that a more democratic regime 
contributes to a decrease in poverty. Thirdly, in low-income countries, only the GDP per 
capita seems to be significant in poverty alleviation, capturing the effect of all the other 
channels, even the impact of inequality or political regime. These three conclusions have 
important political implications. Donor countries and institutions should be aware that 
helping poor countries is not only about financial support, but also and mainly, as this study 
confirms, to create and develop the institutional environment that promotes poverty 
alleviation and thus improves the living conditions of developing countries. The results 
suggest that this environment involves a more democratic political regime, where citizens 
can participate in the selection of their government and that promotes political stability.  
Nevertheless, we do not intend to justify or support the end of foreign aid but rather 
to emphasize the relevance of the quality of the political regime per se, in parallel with the 
quality of aid itself as underlined by some authors, such as Collier and Dollar (2001) and 
Minasyan et al. (2017). 
Giving the existence of multiple definitions of poverty, it would be interesting for 
future research to test whether the conclusions of the present study remain unchanged if 
other measures of poverty were used. In particular, the ones that are related to the 
multidimensional approach of poverty. However, for this to be possible it is necessary to 
invest and promote data availability, namely in what concerns the Multidimensional Poverty 
Index computed by the United Nations. Another relevant topic for future research is to 
investigate the reasons why there are levels of GDP per capita for which the increase of GDP 
per capita seems to lead to more poverty.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Summary table of the literature review on the effectiveness of foreign aid - Qualitative Studies 
  
Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Bourguignon 
and Platteau 
(2017) 
Examine the 
impact of aid 
supply on aid 
effectiveness. 
Literature 
Review 
- - - 
Greater aid availability 
decreases aid effectiveness, 
whether the donor country 
follows a needs-based 
approach or a governance-
based approach. 
Leeson (2008) 
Investigate Bauer's 
hypotheses: 
foreign aid fails to 
promote economic 
progress and 
retard this process; 
private property 
rights are 
necessary and 
sufficient for 
economic 
development. 
Literature 
Review 
- - - 
Evidence available in the 
literature supports Bauer's 
hypotheses: foreign aid does 
not promote economic 
development and property 
rights are the key to this 
process. 
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Appendix 2 - Summary table of the literature review on the effectiveness of foreign aid - Quantitative Studies 
Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Ali and Isse 
(2005) 
Study the impact 
of foreign aid on 
economic growth 
and test its 
effectiveness. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
OLS and 
2SLS 
90 countries; 
period: 1975 
- 2000 
Growth rate of real 
GDPpc  
Initial level of 
Income 
GDPpc in 1975 (-) 
Effect of aid on growth is 
nonlinear (there is a limit for 
foreign aid beyond which 
more aid has a negative 
impact in economic growth). 
Aid effectiveness can only be 
sustained in an environment 
of good economic policy. 
Relationship between 
AID/GDP and economic 
growth is sequential (more 
and more aid lead to lower 
economic growth). 
Level of 
Physical Capital 
Investment/GDP (+) 
Level of 
Human Capital 
Secondary School Enrolment 
Rate  
n. s. 
Measures of 
Institutional 
Quality 
Institutional Quality Index: rule 
of law, repudiation of contracts, 
expropriation risk, bureaucratic 
quality, corruption 
(+) 
Quality of the 
Economic 
Policy 
Policy Index:  Inflation rate, 
Total Trade/GDP ratio, ratio of 
Budget Surplus and Deficit to 
GDP 
(+) 
Aid 
EDA13/GDP n. s. 
EDA2 (-) 
(EDA/GDP)*Policy (+) 
Others 
Dummy to capture the effects of 
belonging to Africa, Latin 
America, Asia 
(-) 
Alvi and 
Senbeta (2012) 
 
Analyse the impact 
of foreign aid on 
poverty in 
recipient 
developing 
countries, after 
controlling for 
income, income 
distribution and 
other determinants 
of poverty. 
 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
GMM 
(Dynamic 
panel data) 
79 countries; 
period: 1981 
- 2004 
Poverty Headcount 
Ratio | Poverty Gap | 
Squared Poverty Gap 
Aid ODA/GNI (-) 
Aid has a significant poverty-
reducing effect even after 
controlling for average 
income and income 
distribution. Composition of 
aid matters (multilateral aid 
and grants are better than 
bilateral aid and loans in 
reducing poverty). Financial 
development has an 
important role in poverty 
alleviation. 
 
Income Log (GDPpc) (-) 
Income 
Distribution  
Log (Gini index) (+) 
Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Poverty Headcount Ratio) t-1 (+) 
(Poverty Gap) t-1 (+) 
(Squared Poverty Gap) t-1 (+) 
Policies and 
institutional 
variables 
Openness: Log [(X+M)/GDP] n.s. 
Democracy score (Polity IV) n.s. 
Log (Domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP)  
(-) 
Age Dependency ratio 
(Dependents/Working-age 
Pop.) 
n.s. 
                                                 
13 Effective Development Assistance 
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Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Bigsten and 
Tengstam 
(2015) 
Discuss and 
quantify the effects 
of improved donor 
coordination on 
aid effectiveness. 
Statistical 
descriptive 
analysis 
26 Donor 
countries; 
Recipient: 
Aid orphans 
(34 
developing 
countries) 
Aid darlings 
(32 
developing 
countries); 
year: 2009 
 
Aid 
Administrative Costs 
There are gains from reduced 
fragmentation of aid and 
gains from coordinated 
allocation across countries. 
Total amount of Aid 
Number of recipients 
ODA 
Bilateral ODA 
CPA14 
Poverty Poverty Headcount Ratio 
Others 
Population 
GDPpc (PPP) 
Boone (1996) 
Examine the 
determinants of 
aid. Analyse the 
importance of 
political regime of 
the recipient 
countries for the 
effectiveness of aid 
programs. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
OLS, Fixed 
Effects 
96 countries; 
period: five-
year averages 
from 1971-
75 to 1986-
90  
ODA15/GNP 
   
Aid flows are largely 
determined by political 
factors. Aid does not increase 
investment nor benefit the 
poor, but it increases the size 
of government. Aid increases 
consumption which does not 
benefit the poor and it has an 
insignificant impact on 
improvements in basic 
measures of human 
development. Aid can be 
effective when it is 
conditional on policy and/or 
political reforms. 
Income pc Log (GNPpc at start of period) (-) 
Size of country Log (Population) (-) 
Dummies to 
capture the 
importance of 
the country to a 
particular donor 
Friends of US, OPEC and 
France 
(+) 
Regional effects 
and external 
shocks 
GNPpc growth rate n.s. 
Terms of trade n.s. 
Debt rescheduling n.s. 
Regional dummies n.s. 
Human 
Development 
Infant Mortality n.s. 
Life Expectancy at Birth n.s. 
                                                 
14 Country Programmable Aid 
15 Official Development Assistance 
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Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Private Consumption 
ODA/GNP 
(+) 
Public and Private 
Investment 
(+) 
Government 
Consumption 
(+) 
Log (Infant Mortality) (-) 
Life expectancy (-) | (+) 
Log (Primary 
Schooling) 
(-) 
Chong et al. 
(2009) 
Examine the effect 
of foreign aid on 
income inequality 
and poverty 
reduction. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
GMM 
(Dynamic 
panel data) 
115 
developing 
countries; 
period: 1971 
- 2002 
Gini coefficient 
Aid16 
ODA/GDP n. s. 
Foreign aid by itself does not 
appear to have significant 
effect on inequality nor 
poverty reduction. This 
insignificant impact is 
explained by corruption and 
poor institutions, as well as 
by misallocation of resources 
and donor countries' 
preferences inconsistent with 
reducing poverty and 
inequality. 
ODA2 n. s. 
ODA*Corruption n. s. 
Institutions 
Index for corruption from 
ICRG 
n. s. 
Others 
Real GDPpc n. s. 
Inflation rate n. s. 
Liquid Liabilities n. s. 
Literacy rate  n. s. 
VA of Agricultural sector (% of 
GDP) 
n. s. 
VA of Industrial sector (% of 
GDP) 
n. s. 
First lag of Gini (+) 
Poverty Headcount 
Ratio | Poverty Gap | 
Squared Poverty Gap 
Aid17 
ODA/GDP n. s. 
ODA2 n. s. 
ODA*Corruption n. s. 
         
                                                 
16 The authors also test others aid proxies such as Effective Development Assistance (EDA) and Aid Commitments. However, the results do not differ much from those obtained when using ODA. 
17 Idem 
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Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Collier and 
Dollar (2001) 
Develop a model 
of efficient aid and 
investigate 
scenarios of policy 
reform and 
efficient aid that 
point the way to 
how the world can 
cut poverty in a 
half. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
OLS (panel 
regressions) 
62 
developing 
countries; 
period: four-
year averages 
from 1974-
77 to 1994-
97 
Growth rate of 
GNPpc 
Aid 
(ODA/GDP) n.s. | (-) 
Poverty reduction depends 
primarily on the quality of 
economic policy. A 
combination of good policy 
and aid produces especially 
good results on economic 
growth and poverty 
reduction. The MDG of 
halving poverty can be 
achieved if foreign aid is 
accompanied with good 
policies. 
 (ODA/GDP)2 (-) 
Policy and 
Institutions 
Measure of Institutional Quality 
(ICRGE) 
(+) 
Level of Policy (CPIA) (+) 
Interaction of 
Policy and Aid  
CPIA*ODA/GDP  (+) 
ICRGE*ODA/GDP (-) 
Others 
Initial GNP pc (+) 
Regional dummies . 
Inflation (Log(inflation +1)) (+) | (-) 
Openness (X+M/GDP) (-) 
Gov. Cons./GDP (-) 
Kaya et al. 
(2013) 
Investigate the 
relationship 
between aid given 
to agricultural 
sector and poverty 
reduction. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
Fixed Effects 
46 
Developing 
aid recipient 
countries; 
period: 1980 
- 2003  
Poverty Headcount 
Ratio  
Government 
Expenditure  
Unweighted PPE residual n.s. | (+) 
Aid given to the agricultural 
sector is effective in reducing 
poverty both directly and 
indirectly through growth. 
Military expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
(+) | n.s. 
Other Government expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
(+) 
Sector-specific 
Foreign Aid 
(ODA only, 
lagged) 
Agriculture aid/GDP (-) 
Social infrastructure aid/GDP n. s. 
Investment aid /GDP n. s.  
Non-investment aid/GDP n. s.  
Others 
GDPpc lagged (-) 
Gini index (+) 
Rural population (% of Total) n. s.  
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Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Minasyan et al. 
(2017) 
How donor 
policies could 
enhance the 
effectiveness of 
aid. Compare the 
effects of quality 
adjusted aid and 
unadjusted aid on 
changes in 
GDPpc. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
Difference-in-
differences 
analysis 
146 countries 
divided in 
two different 
groups 
(treatment 
group - 
received 
higher-
quality 
adjusted aid; 
control 
group - did 
not); period: 
1999-2011 
Difference in GDPpc 
between two points in 
time 
Treatment  
Dummy 1 if in treatment group, 
0 if not 
n.s. 
Significant and quantitatively 
important treatment effects 
for quality-adjusted aid after 
the introduction of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005. 
Development cooperation 
can have positive income 
effects if donors improve the 
quality of their aid. 
2nd period 
Dummy 1 for treatment period, 
0 if not 
n.s. 
Interaction Treatment*2nd period (+) 
Control 
variables for the 
recipient 
country  
Log (Inflation rate) n.s. 
Openness (X+M/GDP) n.s. 
Control of Corruption  n.s. 
Log (Initial GDPpc) n.s. 
Mosley et al. 
(2004) 
Examine the effect 
of aid on poverty 
and analyse the 
benefits of policy 
conditionality on 
the effectiveness 
of aid. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
GMM 3SLS 
estimator 
34 countries; 
period: 1980 
- 2000 
Ln (Poverty 
Headcount Ratio) | 
Ln (Infant Mortality) 
Ln (GNPpc) (-) 
The composition of public 
spending, inequality and 
corruption are strongly 
associated with aid 
effectiveness. Donors 
through a new conditionality 
approach can influence the 
orientation of public 
expenditures towards poverty 
reduction. 
Pro-poor expenditure (PPE) index (-) 
Gini coefficient (+) 
Public Health spending (% GNP) (-) 
ODA/GNP 
Ln (Population) (-) 
Colonialization dummy n.s. 
Islam dummy (+) 
Macro-Policy (+) 
Open n. s.  
Ln (Infant mortality) (+) 
Pro – Poor 
Expenditure index 
Ln (GNPpc) (+) 
Ln (aid) low income (+) 
         
 
 
 47 
Author(s) Main goals 
Research 
Method 
Sample Explained Variable Explanatory Variable(s) and Estimated Effect Conclusions 
Yontcheva and 
Masud (2005) 
Evaluate foreign 
aid effectiveness 
on poverty 
reduction through 
its impact on 
human 
development 
indicators. Test if 
foreign aid reduces 
recipient’s 
government 
efforts in achieving 
development 
goals. 
Econometric: 
 
Method of 
estimation: 
Random 
Effects, Fixed 
Effects, 2SLS 
58 or 76 
developing 
countries; 
period: 1990 
- 2001 
Infant Mortality rate 
Government 
Effort in 
promoting 
Human 
Development 
Ln(Health Expenditure per 
capita) 
(-) 
NGO aid contributes to 
reduce infant mortality and it 
is more effective than 
Bilateral Aid (ODA). In the 
other hand, neither NGO or 
Bilateral aid have a significant 
impact in illiteracy reduction. 
Finally, Bilateral Aid (ODA) 
has a substitution effect on 
public social sector 
expenditures, while NGO aid 
does not influence social 
spending in the recipient 
country. 
Aid 
Ln(ODApc) n.s.  
Ln(NGO aid per capita) (-) 
Others 
Ln(Female Illiteracy) (+) 
Ln(Urban Population (% Total)) n.s. 
Ln(Poverty Headcount Ratio) (+) 
Ln(Population Growth Rate) n.s. 
ICRG index (-) 
IMF Dummy18  n.s. 
Ln(GDPpc) (-) 
Ln(VA of Agricultural sector per 
worker) 
(-) 
Adult illiteracy rate 
Government 
Effort in 
promoting 
Human 
Development 
Ln(Education expenditure per 
capita) 
(-) 
Aid 
Ln(ODApc) n.s. 
Ln(NGO aid per capita) n.s. 
Others 
Ln(Urban Population (% Total)) (-) 
Ln(Poverty Headcount Ratio) n.s. 
Ln(Population Growth Rate) (+) 
ICRG index n.s. 
IMF Dummy n.s. 
Ln(GDPpc) (-) 
 
 
  
                                                 
18 Assumes value 1 if the recipient country has a structural adjustment program supported by the IMF and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3 - Poverty Headcount Ratio, Official Development Assistance and 
Polity IV: average by country, 1995-2015 
 PHR ODApc Polity IV 
Albania 1,22 62,67 7 
Algeria 3,20 5,32 -1 
Argentina 4,79 1,50 8 
Armenia 6,16 49,12 4 
Azerbaijan 1,50 12,14 -6 
Bangladesh 27,95 5,91 4 
Belarus 2,01 6,65 -5 
Benin 50,50 29,07 6 
Bhutan 15,13 83,52 -5 
Bolivia 15,71 55,04 8 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,18 115,43 0 
Botswana 24,00 51,01 8 
Brazil 9,34 1,76 8 
Burkina Faso 59,48 27,01 -1 
Burundi 78,50 20,44 1 
Cabo Verde 12,05 262,32 9 
Cameroon 31,13 29,14 -4 
Central African Republic 65,55 23,81 1 
Chad 50,65 16,92 -3 
Chile 2,66 5,14 9 
China 19,50 0,86 -7 
Colombia 11,29 14,50 7 
Comoros 15,60 32,92 5 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 85,55 20,29 2 
Congo, Rep. 43,60 63,12 -3 
Costa Rica 4,34 6,75 10 
Cote d'Ivoire 25,12 28,64 -1 
Croatia 0,92 16,42 5 
Cyprus 0,04 17,74 10 
Djibouti 20,47 85,87 -1 
Dominican Republic 4,28 10,13 7 
Ecuador 11,28 13,01 7 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,09 14,51 -5 
El Salvador 9,97 34,33 7 
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Ethiopia 47,90 14,56 -1 
Fiji 3,30 57,77 2 
Gambia, The 57,90 15,62 -3 
Georgia 15,60 59,95 6 
Ghana 24,20 27,69 4 
Guatemala 11,20 20,88 7 
Guinea 52,20 16,01 -1 
Guinea-Bissau 60,50 41,52 3 
Honduras 22,08 41,59 7 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,80 1,52 -4 
Iraq 2,30 122,93 -4 
Israel 0,45 324,32 6 
Jamaica 2,60 1,72 9 
Jordan 0,56 95,49 -3 
Kazakhstan 2,06 8,28 -5 
Kenya 27,55 21,22 3 
Korea, Rep. 0,30 -1,61 7 
Kyrgyz Republic 14,25 24,60 1 
Lao PDR 31,23 37,26 -7 
Lesotho 60,50 33,20 6 
Liberia 53,60 66,08 3 
Macedonia, FYR 7,97 58,40 8 
Madagascar 71,05 17,08 6 
Malawi 69,37 28,62 4 
Malaysia 0,68 1,76 4 
Mali 52,60 34,41 5 
Mauritania 14,26 36,22 -4 
Mauritius 0,45 22,89 10 
Mexico 6,96 2,01 6 
Moldova 10,53 29,18 8 
Mongolia 6,84 68,67 9 
Montenegro 0,34 62,29 9 
Morocco 5,63 16,54 -6 
Mozambique 78,17 52,71 3 
Namibia 27,05 78,41 6 
Nepal 41,00 14,87 4 
Nicaragua 12,36 88,86 8 
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Niger 60,68 17,81 4 
Nigeria 56,83 8,69 1 
Pakistan 15,31 6,44 3 
Panama 9,28 7,69 9 
Papua New Guinea 45,60 63,60 4 
Paraguay 7,27 11,03 7 
Peru 10,53 13,78 6 
Philippines 13,01 5,70 8 
Rwanda 66,43 41,10 -4 
Senegal 41,90 42,35 4 
Serbia 0,40 77,27 8 
Sierra Leone 55,40 35,10 2 
Slovenia 0,02 3,65 10 
Solomon Islands 35,35 278,76 7 
South Africa 25,06 13,32 9 
Sri Lanka 5,04 16,88 5 
Swaziland 45,20 21,40 -9 
Tajikistan 20,77 15,11 -3 
Tanzania 63,40 29,61 -2 
Thailand 0,87 1,88 5 
Timor-Leste 43,00 166,16 7 
Togo 52,93 18,37 -3 
Tunisia 5,33 20,00 -2 
Turkey 1,30 2,46 7 
Uganda 52,53 26,54 -3 
Ukraine 0,90 9,73 6 
Uruguay 0,39 6,09 10 
Venezuela, RB 13,28 1,39 5 
Vietnam 17,93 15,65 -7 
Yemen, Rep. 11,87 11,54 -2 
Zambia 53,19 51,28 5 
 
 
 
 
